Abstract

From the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century CE, until the establishment of the first truly supranational European institutions after the Second World War, many attempts were made to unify and bring peace to Europe. While the first attempts were for hegemonic unification, from the fourteenth century on, several plans were put forth for a civil unification. Each of these plans proposed specific institutions which were to bring together the sovereigns and (later) the nations of Europe for a peaceful coexistence. This study describes these numerous proposals, identifying the values and goals underlying the institutional structures each proposal set up. We argue that institutional structures have normative content, in that they embody specific ideologies of the European integration. Our analysis shows that the various proposals embody three distinct ideologies: integration through, and for the purpose of enhancing national sovereignty, integration through federation which limits national sovereignty, and integration through arrangements for free commerce that bypasses national sovereignty.

Keywords: European integration history; European institutions; peace plans; international community;
1. Introduction

This paper traces the history of the idea of European unification and identifies the ideological underpinnings of the various streams of thought about the form such a union should have. It then connects these streams of thought to the origins of the unique supranational policymaking apparatus that subsequently evolved into the European Union. This approach endeavors to show that normative factors (the ideas or beliefs of particular actors) are primarily responsible for the particular direction the process of European integration has followed—from the first proposals for European unification, dating from the 14th and 15th centuries, until the penultimate efforts in the 1920s and 1930s. In tracing this history, we shall also make the argument that these proposals naturally set the parameters for the institutional structure of the ultimate proposal, the Schuman Plan of 1950 for a European Coal and Steel Community.

Traditional analyses of the European integration process have generally divided into two broad categories: structuralist and institutionalist. Structuralist interpretations view this process as a set or responses to objective structural imperatives. Major works in the structuralist tradition include Milward (1992) and Moravcsik (1998). These interpretations comprehend the European integration as a process wherein national governments work together to build particularly strong European institutions to meet specific policy challenges.

Institutionalism interpretations concede that structural imperatives resulted in the original institutions of European integration. They argue, however, that once these institutions were in place, they acted as agents of integration, initiating new projects and mobilizing political coalitions to extend the breadth of integration. Major works reflecting the institutionalist approach include Haas (1958), Schmitter (1969a, 1969b), and Sandholtz and Sweet (1998).

Both the structuralist and institutionalist approaches tend to discount the role of individuals. However, a growing body of literature presents compelling evidence to the fact that individual actors’ beliefs are important causes of political outcomes, including the shaping of institutional structures. These analyses also show that actors’ beliefs are reflected in the institutional structures which they shaped and that, therefore, institutional structures have normative content (Berman, 1998; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Hall, 1993 and 1989; Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1999; Parsons, 2002).
Recognizing this fact, one can make the argument that similarly structured institutions embody similar ideologies. Furthermore, the ideology inherent in the structure of an institution would tend to favor outcomes that are consistent with the norms and values the particular ideology embodies.

2. Efforts at European unification through hegemony: 9th-13th centuries

The roots of efforts to unite Europe politically stretch far into the past—running at least seven centuries long (Smith, 1992). Soon after the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, a nostalgic desire for a reconstitution of the *Pax Romana* (Roman Peace) provided some validation to efforts to resurrect the empire in the west. The hope of reconstitution of imperial order and peace in Western Europe seemed to be fulfilled in 800 CE by the coronation by Pope Leo III of Charlemagne as Holy Roman Emperor. While the reconstituted empire lasted formally until 1806, when it was dissolved by the last Emperor, Francis II, its existence as a cohesive political entity, unifying a large segment of Europe, lasted less than 100 years after Charlemagne’s coronation (Jacob, 1928; Wilson, 2016).

As the prospect of a pan-European Christian empire faded in the 10th century, the hope for peace and stability shifted to Rome itself, and the Holy See. Thus, the *Pax Romana* was, for a time, replaced with the idea of *Pax Dei* (the Peace of God), which was first proclaimed in 989, at the council of Charroux. It sought to limit the violence that had already become endemic to the western part of the Holy Roman Empire by using the threat of spiritual sanctions (such as excommunication) for some of the worst offences (Head and Landes, 1995; Duby, 1977; Cowdray, 1970). The unification of Europe under the spiritual authority of the Pope, however, proved even more problematic than that under the authority of the Holy Roman Emperor. For example, the attempt by the Pope to place bishops in secular positions with political power (a process termed *lay investiture*) was strenuously resisted by the sovereigns. This conflict ended in 1152 when Pope Callixtus II and Holy Roman Emperor Henry V reached an agreement, codified in the Concordat of Worms. In this agreement, the Pope retained the authority to appoint clerics and religious officials but gave up any claim to appointing clerics in secular offices (de Mesquita, 2000). The spiritual authority of the Pope in Europe reached its highest point in the 12th and 13th centuries, as the various kingdoms more or less united in pursuit of the crusades (Bisson, 2009; Watt, 1965). After that, the
challenges to the authority of the church multiplied and intensified. These included the emergence of nation-states and the reformation—developments that effectively eliminated any prospect for the unification of Europe and the establishment of peace through hegemonic power and authority (Aron, 2003; Møller, 2014).

3. Early proposals toward a “civil peace”, 14th and 15th centuries

The early efforts to unite Europe and achieve peace through hegemony clearly cannot be considered to have influenced directly the modern pursuit of European integration. They do, however, constitute a prelude and motivation for the evolution of ideas in the latter Middle Ages that began to examine the concept of civil (in contrast to imperial) peace (Aron, 2003, p. 151-152; Parchami, 2009, p. 31). As the idea of a revitalized Roman Empire began to be replaced by the emergence of the state nation, political thinkers started to realize the dangers inherent in this process of transformation. The idea of nation state, after all, is predicated in separateness and differentiation and, therefore, disunity proved to be intrinsic to the evolution of the European political system from the latter Middle Ages onward.

The threats to peace, stability, and justice from competing nation states were clear and pervasive. Furthermore, as challenges to the spiritual authority of the Roman Catholic Church started to emerge in the 13th and 14th centuries, the hope that the Church would retain, let alone increase its role in keeping the peace faded. As a result, political theorists and practitioners started exploring alternative paths to peaceful co-existence. It did not take long for the idea that a civil, non-hegemonic political union could protect peace and justice to appear as a realistic alternative to hegemony.

3.1. Pierre Dubois and the proposal for a European confederation

One of the earliest proposals for such a union, dating from 1306, came from the French jurist and political theorist Pierre Dubois. Dubois’s proposal, in a pamphlet titled “De recuperatione Terre Sancte” (1306), which he sent to kings Edward I of England and Philip IV of France, ostensibly concerned the undertaking of a successful crusade. In this pamphlet, sections of which were directed exclusively to the king of France, Dubois
urged Philip IV to lead an initiative for a civil confederation of European states.

Dubois understood that the undertaking of a crusade would require the securing of peace, justice, and stability in Europe. He saw a political union as a necessary prerequisite for the successful recovery and defense of the Holy Land. Dubois proposed the establishment of a permanent council, which would “consist of princes as well as ecclesiastics” (Brandt, 1956), effecting a European confederation. The French monarch would convene and preside over this institution.

The Council would have the authority to act against vassals who committed acts of aggression against each other or against their sovereign (Dubois, 1306, par. 5). Once the aggressors could be brought to justice, they would be exiled by the Council to the Holy Land, where, on the one hand they would find a proper outlet for their desire to pursue war, and on the other, they would help colonize the area with a Roman Catholic population. The Council would be empowered to reward all those who assisted in the suppression and punishment of the aggressors, with plenary indulgences (blanket absolutions of sin) which would be confirmed by the Pope (one assumes, through his representatives on the council).

If the aggression was from one sovereign against another, the council would appoint a panel of arbitrators. This panel would select a court of nine judges, three neutral members and three from each of the warring sides (Dubois, 1306, par. 12). The decision of this court would be enforced in the same manner as that of the council.

The ideology represented by the institutions of the European Confederation proposed by Dubois is revealed by looking at them through the lens of the historical temporal and geographic milieu within which he operated. At the end of the 13th and beginning of the 14th century, France had emerged as the preeminent power in Europe. Philip IV represented a transformational force in the history of France and Europe. By relying on civil servants such as Guillaume de Nogaret and Enguerrand de Marigny to govern, rather than on nobles, and by granting serfs the right to purchase their freedom, Philip set into motion the transformation of the French political system from feudalism into a centralized state. Externally, he challenged any authority higher than his own, refusing any allegiance to the Holy Roman Emperor, and battling with Pope Boniface VIII for control of the clergy and of church properties in France. Philip destroyed the Knights Templar, managed to get a Frenchman elected Pope (Clement V),
and to move the official seat of the Holy See to Avignon, placing the church under French control (Strayer, 1980). To secure support for his actions against the church, Philip conceived the idea of assembling the Estates General, with the first meeting in Paris in 1302, which Pierre Dubois attended as a bourgeois representative.

Dubois’s proposal embodies the ideas of national sovereignty and secularism promulgated in France at that time. Not only does he differentiate between sovereign “princes” and their vassal nobles, but he explicitly describes the former as *principes superiores in terris non recognoscentes*, which Brandt translates as “princes who recognize no superior authority on earth” (1956, p. 78). Therefore, the structures of the council and the arbitration body explicitly affirm and guarantee the supremacy of these princes over all other secular and religious authority. Although some of the penalties and rewards to be meted out by the council or the court (as discussed above) are religious in nature and to be delivered by the Holy See, Dubois assumes that the Pope will have little or no discretion in the matter (Dubois, 1306, par. 7). In fact, secularism permeates Dubois’s proposals that complement his ideas on the institutions of the European confederation. In later sections of his pamphlet he proposes significant reforms of the church, of education, and of the judicial system (Brandt, 1956, pp. 39-41). Thus, his proposal introduces some of the fundamental ideas and principles of modern proposals for European integration.

### 3.2. George of Bohemia’s proposed Treaty

More than a hundred and fifty years later a similar proposal for the European confederation was put forth by George of Podebrad (1420–71, King of Bohemia, 1458–71). The ostensible purposes of the confederation were the maintenance of peace in Europe and the defense of the continent from the encroachment of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. The confederation was to be governed by a set of formal institutions, the principal of which was to be an Assembly, comprising of plenipotentiary representatives of the heads of the member states. King George envisaged, and, informally offered, the King of France the presiding position of the confederation.

George of Podebrad’s proposal was much more detailed than Dubois’s. For example, the proposal described where the organization was to be based. The Assembly was to be a permanent body, based in a city of each of the member states for five years, before moving to the next. The Assembly
was to employ a body of civil servants who, however, would not be permanent employees, being drawn every five years, in turn, from the country in which it was based (Heymann, 1972, pp. 87-88). The second institution of the confederation was a Tribunal, the purpose of which was to administer justice, but the organization of which was left to the Assembly (Kapras, 1919, p. 15).

The Assembly of King George’s proposal would exercise functions similar to Dubois’s council. The Assembly’s operation is, however, also described in much more detail. It would reach its decisions by majority vote, although not by the vote of each individual state. Instead, the member states were to be organized in groups called “nationes.” For example, the several German states would constitute the German nation, and would have to agree amongst themselves on how to cast their single vote (Heymann, 1972, p.25). Unlike Dubois’s council, the Assembly would have the power to raise and direct armies.

King George’s proposal would, essentially, create the world’s first formal international organization. The organization was to have a number of explicitly described powers. It would receive revenue from the member states in proportion to the tax base of each. It would have its own coat of arms, seal, treasury, and archive (Kapras, 1919, p. 15). It would have a large body of high and low rank officials, among them a sindicus (secretary-general or chancellor), a procurator fiscalis (treasurer), collectors (tax collectors), etc. (Heymann, 1972, pp. 22-29).

Unlike Dubois’s proposal, which was essentially theoretical, the proposal put forth by King George of Bohemia, was an actual treaty: Tractatus Pacis Toti Christianitati Fiendae (Treaty on the Establishment of Peace throughout Christendom). It is almost certain that King George did not develop this proposal alone, but in close consultation and on the advice of his adviser and counsellor, Antoine Martini of Grenoble (Kapras, 1919, p. 9). The treaty was sent to King Casimir of Poland in the summer of 1463, and its text was recorded in the archives of the Polish Royal Chancellery (the Metryka koronna). There is also evidence that between 1462 and 1464 Martini traveled to Venice, Burgundy, and France, to discuss this treaty (Heymann, 1972, pp. 37-39). The historical circumstances of the period immediately preceding the development of the proposal, and the reception and ultimate fate of the treaty in the courts of Europe reveal the norms and values underlying the proposal and the outcome King George and Martini had hoped to achieve.
In the early part of the 15th century, a pre-Protestant Christian reform movement, the Hussite movement, emerged in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, posing the first serious theological challenge to the Catholic Church. Attempts by the Holy Roman Empire, the Papacy, and various monarchs loyal to the Church, led to the Hussite Wars, which lasted from 1419 to about 1434, and ultimately resulted in a compromise, ratified by the Council of Basel in 1436. The compromise reconciled the moderate Hussite faction, led by George of Podebrad, with the Catholic Church, while allowing the Hussites certain freedoms (Heymann, 1965). George was elected king by the Estates of Bohemia in 1458 and he worked to reconcile the Hussites and Catholics of the kingdom. Nevertheless, opposition in Rome to the existence of the Hussite church increased with the election of Pope Pius II, who, in 1462, declared the compacts of the Council of Basel null and void.

George of Bohemia responded to the threat from Rome by speeding up the transformation of the Government of Bohemia into a secular regime and by intensifying diplomatic efforts that promoted secular governance, religious freedom, and independence of nation states from Rome and the Holy Roman Empire. The proposed Treaty for the Establishment of Peace throughout Christendom was George’s ultimate and most ambitious effort in that regard. A close reading of the articles establishing the Assembly reveals the ideological underpinnings of this institution. The Assembly makes no reference to the authority of the Church as a means for coercion or reward in enforcing the peace among its member states. While allowing membership of the Holy Roman Emperor, it is only as sovereign of a German Kingdom and, therefore, as an equal among equals. On the other hand, the Pope is explicitly excluded from membership, even though he is, in fact, also the monarch of the Papal State. In this way, while the treaty also explicitly guarantees the Pope’s ecclesiastical power, it implicitly removes his ability to interfere in secular matters (Kapras, 1919, p. 13). Thus, the institution is revealed to be a vehicle for secularism, national sovereignty, and religious freedom. Although defense against Ottoman expansion in Europe is a significant concern, as the proposal comes only nine years after the fall of Constantinople, it is rather clear that the main outcome George hoped for if his treaty were enacted, was the security of his and of all the other sovereign governments of Europe, and their independence from Rome and the Holy Roman Empire. This is revealed in
the vehemence with which the papacy resisted the proposed treaty, ultimately managing to doom it to failure (Heymann, 1972).

4. The aftermath of the Wars of Religion: Peace proposals in the 17th and 18th centuries

On October 31, 1517, the publication of the *Disputatio pro declaration virtutis indulgentiarum* (Disputation on the Power of Indulgences) by Martin Luther, unleashed a chain of events which made any proposal for the European unification impossible for over a hundred years. The popular support for this challenge to the Catholic Church was taken up by a number of German free cities and nobles and was utilized to assert independence from the Holy Roman Emperor (Scott, 1989). The first conflict, the “knights’ revolt” in 1522, provided the spark that ignited a conflagration which consumed the continent for well over a century (Hitchcock, 1958). The so-called, European wars of religion reached their climax in the Thirty Years’ War (1618-1648), having devastated central and western Europe and caused the death of between 8 and 10 million people. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which ended this 126-year-long conflict, effectively established the modern international system of sovereign states (Croxton, 1999).

4.1. Éméric Crucé’s plan for universal peace

While the period of the wars of religion effectively prohibited the evolution of any proposals for the European unification, the devastation it wrought upon the continent did provide impetus for such proposals as the Thirty Years’ War approached its conclusion (Villaverde, 2017). The first proposal for a lasting peace came from Éméric Crucé (c1590-1648), a French writer about whom very few specifics are known. In 1623, Crucé published a book titled “Le Nouveau Cynée ou Discours d’Estat représentant les occasions et moyens d’establir une paix générale et la liberté de commerce pour tout le monde” (The New Cyneas or Discourse of the occasions and means to establish a general peace and free commerce throughout the world). In this book, Crucé argued that the foundation of a permanent general peace should be the common humanity which overarches differences of race, religion, or culture (Mansfield, 2013). In this, Crucé’s proposal differed from all those preceding it, and most of those following it, in that it included not only the Christian nations of Europe, but the nations of Asia
and Africa as well, namely the Ottoman Empire, Persia, India, China, and Ethiopia (Terminski, 2010).

While Crucé’s “New Cyneas” could be considered more of a predecessor of developments such as the League of Nations and the United Nations than of the European integration, it is nevertheless important to discuss it in the context of efforts toward European unification because of its likely influence on later proposals (Mansfield, 2013). In “New Cyneas” Crucé argued that war was the result of pride, posturing and generally, misunderstandings among governments and sovereigns. He argued that the potential for conflict could be reduced and, ultimately, eliminated through the establishment of free commerce which would increase communication and bring people together (Balch, 1909, pp. x-xii). To this end, he proposed a single currency, standardization of weights and measures, and guaranteeing the free movement of people and goods (Mansfield, 2013). In order to protect this system of free trade, and reduce the prospect of war, Crucé proposed a permanent international body, a council of princes or their representatives, which would be based in Venice (a pre-eminent global trading power). This council would serve both as a facilitator of communication between the governments of sovereign nations, and as a tribunal adjudicating both national and international disputes (Mansfield, 1900).

Crucé’s ideas for the pursuit of a permanent and universal peace centered on the protection of national sovereignty while, at the same time, introducing a system which would make peace increasingly profitable for all states that participated in it. The expansion of trade that would result from direct measures such as a common currency and standardization, as well as indirectly through the maintenance of peace, stability, and justice, would make it profitable for sovereigns to maintain peace, and unprofitable to pursue war. In addition, the expansion of trade and merchant classes to the detriment of the warrior class would increase social support for peace rather than war (Terminski, 2010; Mansfield, 2013).

4.2. The Duke of Sully’s Grand Design

Although Crucé’s book remained obscure, there is some evidence to support the claim that it was known to, and influenced the proposals of his near contemporary, Maximilien de Béthune, Duke of Sully (1560-1641) (Villaverde, 2017). The Duke of Sully was a Huguenot (French protestant) statesman who served as advisor and Superintendent of Finances (minister
of finance) to King Henry IV of France, who presented, in his memoirs, a Grand Design for the establishment and perpetuation of peace in Europe. Sully attributed this design to Henry IV, though this claim is almost certainly false. The Grand Design proposed the European federation consisting of fifteen roughly equal states with three types of political systems: six hereditary monarchies (France, Spain, Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Lombardy), five elective monarchies (Holy Roman Empire, Papal States, Poland, Hungary, and Bohemia), and four republics (Venice, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium/Netherlands). The federation would be governed by a senate of about sixty-six representatives apportioned to the participating States (Ogg, 1921, pp. 41-44). The senators would be elected every three years. There would be subordinate and local assemblies, whose composition and powers were not defined in any detail. Nevertheless, the general senate would be the only body empowered to produce “final and irrevocable decrees.”

In contrast to Crucé’s ideas about universality, an important objective of Sully’s federation was to protect its members from threats emanating from the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, similar to Crucé, Sully placed equal importance (and possibly greater significance) to the prospect that the federation would impose freedom of commerce among its member states (Ogg, 1921, p. 11).

Sully’s Grand Design appeared in the memoirs he published in 1638 and echoes the values and intentions of Dubois and George of Bohemia as well as, at least partially, those of Crucé. Its main governing body would be comprised of representatives of sovereign states. The institutional structure of the federation would clearly espouse secularism. These values are revealed by the inclusion of the Pope as a secular sovereign, and the Holy Roman Emperor as one sovereign among fifteen. Sully’s proposal is based on the attainment of a balance of power among the fifteen states. Of particular concern to him was the power of the Habsburg (Holy Roman) Empire. For the purpose of limiting this power, Sully proposed that the title of Holy Roman Emperor return to being an elected office—one for which all the princes of Germany should be eligible. To this end also was the recognition and protection of the independence of the Belgian (Low Countries) and Italian republics. This international order clearly anticipates the structure that would be established a mere ten years later by the Peace of Westphalia. The provisions promoting freedom of commerce reflect the
author’s experience in governing France’s finances, and foresee the proposals for the European integration developed in the 20th century.

Sully’s Grand Design was explicitly referenced and used as a basis for another plan for the European unification—that of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (Balch, 1900, van Heerikhouizen, 2008). This plan was first published in Utrecht, in 1713—the place and year marking the peace negotiations to end the War of Spanish Succession. Saint-Pierre’s volume titled “Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe” (Project for establishing permanent peace in Europe) described the conditions necessary for guaranteeing that the Peace of Utrecht would last in perpetuity. Unlike Sully’s concern over the Habsburg Empire’s level of power and control of European affairs, however, Saint-Pierre’s concern was the threat of French hegemony under Louis XIV (Mansfield, 2013). Therefore, it is interesting to note that Saint-Pierre’s proposed structure for securing peace very much resembles that proposed by Sully (a Perpetual Congress, or Senate, comprised of representatives of the member states, and a fundamental treaty guaranteeing the territory, rights and privileges of each sovereign agreeing to it). Thus, a system guaranteeing sovereignty and territorial integrity, based on a balance of power, seemed to both men to be the best way to preserve peace in Europe (van Heerikhuizen, 2008).

4.3. From intergovernmentalism to federation: Saint-Pierre, Penn, Rousseau and Bentham

While the proposals of Crucé, Sully, and Saint-Pierre sought to promote peace and stability in Europe (or, in the case of Crucé, in the entire world) through the safeguarding of national sovereignty and establishing a balance of power, serious doubts remained as to whether sovereignty, which had, in fact, been the source of so much conflict in the course of the 17th century, could be transformed into an effective vehicle for peace. Reacting to the same historical milieu as Saint-Pierre, specifically, the series of wars pursued by Louis XIV from 1667 onwards, William Penn also felt compelled to develop a plan for promoting peace in Europe.

Penn, alarmed by the human misery, devastation, injustice, and waves of refugees produced by France’s offensive wars, which had been pursued for the expansion of its power and not as a result of any threat to its sovereignty, wrote An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693-94). In it, he proposed that the solution to international conflict was the same as to internal conflict: justice and tolerance (Penn, 1693, Sect. II).
However, just as these values could not be guaranteed domestically by a government of absolute monarchical rule, so could they not be pursued at the international level without a democratic system of governance? Thus, for Penn, the solution to the problem of war was to be found in the establishment of the European government based on the model of the Dutch parliamentary system. In the same way as the provinces of the Netherlands sent deputies to the States General, seated at The Hague, the nations of Europe, including non-Christian countries, would send deputies to a European Diet or Parliament (van Heerikhuisen, 2008). Thus, for the first time, a proposal for European unification is put forth that explicitly limits national sovereignty and establishes a truly federal structure.

The ideas of Crucé, Sully, Penn, and Saint-Pierre received little attention from political figures of their times (17th and early 18th centuries). Nevertheless, they did influence European political philosophers and were revived at the end of the 18th century, as challenges to absolute monarchy emerged in continental Europe, ultimately leading to the French Revolution and another era of intense international conflict. Political thinkers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham revived the earlier proposals and refined them, putting forth their own plans for the European common polity.

Rousseau was particularly fascinated by Saint-Pierre’s proposal for a European Federation. He was both its critic and proponent (van Heerikhuisen, 2008). He believed it to be totally impractical because monarchs were too proud and ambitious to accept and submit to a supranational legal order. On the other hand, he did see a possibility for such an order to be established, but only through violent means:

No Federation could ever be established except by a revolution. That being so, which of us would dare to say whether the League of Europe is a thing more to be desired or feared? It would perhaps do more harm in a moment than it would guard against for ages. (Rousseau, 1782)

If the European federation were to be established and to be effective in protecting peace, it would need to have at its disposal the means to coerce national sovereigns to accede to the demands of a central authority such as Saint-Pierre’s Congress. Thus, in Rousseau’s view, the Congress would need to have at its disposal a federal army, making the Congress much more of a federal institution (along the lines of William Penn’s proposal) than Saint-Pierre’s assembly of national government representatives (Rousseau, 1782).
Proceeding from a philosophical perspective entirely different from that of Rousseau, Jeremy Bentham reached a very similar conclusion. In his fourth essay of *The Principles of International Law*, titled “A Plan for a Universal and Perpetual Peace”, published in 1789, he sets two conditions necessary for universal peace: the emancipation of colonies and the reduction and limitation of national sovereignty. To achieve the second condition, Bentham proposes the establishment of a European Congress or Diet (to be elected directly by the people of Europe) and a Court of Justice (Bentham, 1789). These clearly federal institutions, Bentham hoped, would be able to realize the conditions for a permanent peace in Europe: freedom of the press, free trade, reduction in military expenditures, and the emancipation of all colonies.

Ultimately, neither Rousseau’s nor Bentham’s proposals were put in practice. At the end of the 18th century, the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon Bonaparte revived a push for hegemonic integration of Europe, reminiscent of the 9th century. However, the new cycle of war and devastation served to preserve and, even intensify, the hope for a civil peace through political integration of Europe.

5. New ideas for promoting a common European identity: the 19th century

In 1814, as the order of the post-Napoleonic Europe was being created at the Vienna Congress, the Count Henri de Saint-Simon and his pupil *cum* secretary Augustin Thierry published a plan for the European Federation that was explicitly addressed to the British and French parliaments, but was disseminated widely, really directed to the political and social elites of Europe. This plan, while similar in some respects to previous proposals, contained some significant differences. First, it anticipated that the process of industrialization, then barely begun, would create social forces which could work for the unity of Europe. In essence, the plan aimed not only to bring peace to the continent, but also to promote economic prosperity. Second, Saint-Simon predicted, and clearly stated so in the plan, that a prerequisite for the European unification would be the ascendance of parliamentary power in Europe. Third, breaking with all previous proposals, Saint-Simon’s plan did not call for an immediate broad union but, rather, envisioned an incremental process, calling for an immediate union of only Britain and France which would broaden only as other European states adopted parliamentary systems and chose to participate.
Fourth, Saint-Simon understood that another prerequisite for European Union was the creation of a European identity which did not as yet exist. He also understood that supranational institutions would be instrumental in the creation of such an identity. In order to get around the problem of establishing such institutions without a widely established common identity, he proposed that those socio-economic groups which he assumed did have a European outlook comprise these institutions. Specifically, he proposed a bicameral European Parliament, the members of the lower chamber (Chamber of Deputies) of which would come exclusively from certain professional groups:

These deputies would be elected not through a plebiscite, but by their respective professional associations. Because of its emphasis on economic (as well as security) considerations and its reliance on professional and technical expertise, Saint-Simon’s plan can be considered the first to contain functionalist elements.

Although the institutional structure of Saint-Simon’s proposal is, on the surface, a bi-cameral parliament, it is fundamentally different from the parliamentary structures that had been proposed by William Penn and Jeremy Bentham. While their parliaments are directly elected from and by the people of Europe and are, therefore, democratic, federalist institutions, Saint-Simon’s Parliament is elevated from and by a technocracy. While its structure is functionalist, placing faith on slowly building upon narrow common interests to eventually broaden the reach of the European institutions, its ideological foundation is non-democratic. It elevates expertise above common sense, and it privileges the new technocratic elite of the emerging industrial era.

Henri de Saint-Simon represents the leading edge of a growing wave of efforts toward European integration. The idea of a unified Europe became an almost permanent aspect of international political discourse during the nineteenth century. By the second quarter of that century, the European peace movement grew, becoming established in almost all of the continent’s nations. As it had always been closely associated with the European idea, the two moved forward together in an increasingly intimate association. Thus, from the middle of the century onwards, the “European idea entered into nearly all of the numerous international peace conferences and congresses...” (Pegg, 1983, p. 4).
6. The 20th century: commerce at the core of the European integration efforts

The dawning of the 20th century brought some new concerns and sparked new ideas for the raison d’etre and the path of the European integration. While the desire for peace remained the strongest impetus for pushing for European unification, a number of prominent Europeans, echoing the sentiments of Saint-Simon, became increasingly concerned about Europe’s ability to maintain its economic primacy, especially in view of the growing economic power of the United States primarily, and Russia secondarily. Thus, for the first time, proposals for economic integration were put forth by people such as Anatole and Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, Sir Max Waechter (who in early 1914 established in London the European Unity League to work for a “Federation of the States of Europe on an economic basis”), the Prince de Cassano, and others (Pegg, 1983).

The outbreak of hostilities which marked the onset of the World War I in August 1914 did not eliminate or even suspend the hopes for a united Europe. In the early days of the war, pacifists throughout Europe felt that the conflict would make obvious the shortcomings of militant nationalism and ultimately enhance prospects for unity among the nations of the continent. As a result, many Europeanist organizations sprang up in the Entente countries, as well as in Germany and Austria-Hungary. The war effort itself necessitated integrating the allies’ efforts in the economic, as well as the military sphere. A prominent example of this integration was the Inter-Allied Maritime Transport Council (IAMTC) which, though it did not survive long after the end of the war, laid the foundations for future efforts at integration in specific functional areas. By the end of the war, however, two forces combined to diffuse this movement. On the one hand, the geographic expansion of the war, particularly with the entrance of the United States, shifted the peace movement from a European to a global focus. On the other, the retreat of Russia from its Baltic provinces and Poland and the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire brought on demands for the right of national self determination that worked against the prospect of European federation (Pegg, 1983, pp. 11-14).

After the end of World War I there were, again, numerous proposals and efforts towards European unification despite the peace movement’s shift of focus towards the League of Nations. Of these efforts, two deserve particular attention because they, in many ways, anticipated the
developments that took place after World War II. The first of these came from Louis Loucheur, a French industrialist who during the war moved to increasingly more important government positions. In 1918, immediately following the end of hostilities, Loucheur was appointed to the newly created office of Minister for Industrial Reconstruction. He immediately saw that reconstruction, future economic prosperity, and peace and stability, would all be enhanced by close economic cooperation. Thus, in 1919, he proposed the formation of an international steel cartel encompassing France, Germany, Luxembourg, and Belgium. In 1925, he presented a proposal for a world economic conference to the League of Nations on behalf of the French delegation. His hope was that such a conference would promote free trade, and that within its auspices, there would be an opportunity to push for a European customs union. Speaking about the conference, which was to be held in May 1927, “he told an audience at the University of Brussels that issues related to a European customs union would be discussed at the conference and that the European delegates should keep in mind the ‘possibility of at least the beginning of the United States of Europe.’ He repeated the themes in a speech to a group of German businessmen in April [1927], adding that the formation of industrial cartels should precede tariff reductions” (Carls, 1993, p. 268). Unfortunately, the World Economic Conference produced no action other than some reports. Nevertheless, Loucheur continued to argue for a European economic union until the end of his life in 1931 (Carls, 1993, pp. 262-301).

The second effort came in 1929 from then foreign minister of France, Aristide Briand, who in a speech at the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations proposed an economic association of the nations of Europe. This suggestion was received positively by many of the representatives of the European League members and in an unofficial meeting of the heads of the European delegations a few days later, it was agreed that the French Foreign Ministry would draft a memorandum on the European federal system which it would formally present to the other European governments who would study it and respond. The Memorandum on the Organization of a System of the European Federal Union was released on May 17, 1930, and presented to the twenty-seven European nations that were members of the League of Nations (i.e., this excluded Turkey and the Soviet Union). The Memorandum proposed an organization independent of the League of Nations (however, it was
envisioned that it would operate in close cooperation with the League), but whose institutions resembled those of the League: a Conference (i.e., a general assembly of all the member states), a Permanent Political Committee (an executive body composed of a small number of member states), and a Secretariat (the organization’s administrative body). While the large majority of European countries reacted positively to this proposal, Germany, Britain, and Italy opposed it.

Each of these three large European countries was averse to any proposal of European unification for its own reasons. Germany saw the European Federal Union as an institution that would make the status quo of national borders permanent. This would threaten its attempts to reshape its eastern borders to include the large German populations in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and elsewhere. Britain was more interested in integrating the economies of its vast empire and with maintaining close cooperation with the United States. Italy, which was already under Fascist rule, was interested in creating an empire. However, because of the broad support for the proposal, none of these three countries rejected it outright. Instead, they worked to subvert it, first by insisting that the organization can be created within the framework of the League of Nations (where they knew they could count on the suspicion and, even, hostility, toward the idea by non-European nations), then by insisting that non-League countries such as Turkey and the Soviet Union (and even countries with no European territories whatsoever) may be invited to participate in the organization and generally, making whatever proposals they thought would slow down the process of setting up the organization (Pegg, 1983, pp. 103-165). As a result, the best Briand was able to accomplish was the creation of a Commission of Inquiry for the European Union under the auspices of the League of Nations. The Commission was established on September 17, 1930, (three days after the German elections in which the National Socialists scored significant gains) and Briand was elected its president. It met for two years and, while it made some progress, its mission ultimately failed due to the rise of totalitarianism in Europe and to Briand’s death in March 1932.

Both Loucheur’s and Briand’s proposals were essentially technocratic and functionalist in nature, focusing on achieving a breakthrough in one functional area, trade, so as to establish a structure that would permanently engage the nations of Europe in close contact, cooperation, and on-going negotiation. While Briand’s proposal did not include any particular
institutional structure, Loucheur’s would have put in place a structure which mimicked that of the League of Nations. Political control, thus, would have rested with institutions that were structured to represent national governments (the Conference and the Permanent Political Committee), which would have given preeminence to national sovereignty concerns. One must note, however, that the reactions of Germany, Britain, and Italy reveal the real possibility that such an organization would place significant restraints on the exercise of national sovereignty—something that was at least one of Briand’s and France’s expectations vis a vis the proposed European Federal Union (Pegg, 1983, pp. 103-165).

7. Conclusion

It should not be surprising that a review of the history of proposals for the European integration would reveal that the authors of the proposals tried to address the particular threats to peace and stability in Europe of their historical milieu. The first important finding of this paper is that there are important and significant similarities in the nature of these threats across surprisingly long spans of time.

From the early 14th century until the end of the 17th century, the main threat to peace, stability, and prosperity in Europe was not external (i.e. Ottoman expansion). It was not even the political fragmentation of Europe, per se, but, rather, the attempt to eliminate this fragmentation through the establishment of a hegemonic order. The plans of Pierre Dubois, George of Bohemia, Éméric Crucé, and the Duke of Sully, were all designed to address the threat that the Holy Roman Empire and the Catholic Church presented for the broad community of European nations. To put it plainly, the threat was to local (and, eventually national) political and religious self-determination.

In the late 17th and 18th centuries, the nature of the threat to peace in Europe remained the same, but it now took the form of French expansionism and attempt at European hegemony. The plans of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and William Penn attempted to address this problem in two different ways. Saint-Pierre followed the spirit of earlier proposals for a confederation of sovereign nation states. Penn, for the first time, proposed the limitation of national sovereignty through a true federation.

The period from the late 18th to the first half of the 20th centuries saw a continuation of the conflict between the nations of France and Germany
(the latter having lost its mantle of legitimacy as the Holy Roman Empire) for European hegemony, albeit with the emergence of powers at the periphery and outside Europe: Britain, Russia, and the United States of America. The plans of Rousseau, Bentham, Saint-Simon, Loucheur, and Briand all respond to the emergence of nationalism and, therefore, national sovereignty as the primary impediment to peace, security, and prosperity in Europe.

The first conclusion of this study, then, is that all of the plans for European integration, from the early 14th century to the mid-20th century were, primarily, responses to the threat of the hegemonic European order. We also see that the specific shape of that threat did change over time but, at the core of it, there remained a tension between France on the one side, and the Holy Roman Empire (and its descendant, Germany) on the other.

These findings lead us to the second conclusion of my paper. The institutions proposed by the several plans for European integration do have normative content. Each set of the proposed institutions, in fact, embodies the values at the core of the resistance to hegemony present in each of the three historic periods described above.

The plans put forth by Pierre Dubois, George of Bohemia, Éméric Crucé, the Duke of Sully, and the Abbé de Saint-Pierre all propose the establishment of an institution comprised of either sovereigns themselves or their representatives (let us term this institution a Council). In all instances, participation of religious authority (namely the Catholic Church) in such a Council is severely restricted or entirely prohibited. The institution of an intergovernmental Council embodies the values of local/national autonomy in the political and religious spheres, expressed as the principle of secular sovereignty. A European Council of national representatives is an instrument for the protection of sovereignty and for resistance to any attempt at political or religious hegemony. These plans, and the institutions they propose, respond to the threats we identified in the first period (13th to late 17th centuries) we discussed above. Saint-Pierre’s plan is similar to the earlier ones because he perceived the threat to peace of Louis XIV as an attempt at both political and religious hegemony. After all, Louis XIV revoked the Edict of Nantes (which, since 1598, had granted protection to protestants in France) and commenced active persecution of non-Catholics in his realm (Villaverde, 2017).

From the late 17th century on, the primary threat to peace in Europe came from conflicts among sovereign national entities. In the early part of
this period, the conflict was essentially between Monarchs; therefore, the appropriate response seemed to be European institutions representing a more pluralistic form of governance. Consequently, the plans put forth by William Penn, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Jeremy Bentham, all proposed institutions that represented the people of Europe directly, rather than their sovereign national governments (let us term this type of institution a Parliament). The European Parliaments proposed by these political philosophers embody the ideologies of representative government and democratic supra-nationalism (federalism). They are an instrument for checking, limiting, and reducing the power of monarchs specifically and more broadly, the extent of national sovereignty.

The aftermath of the French revolution, seen in the history of the 19th and 20th centuries, revealed that representative government was not, in and of itself, a shield against either nationalism or war. The system of the European states, even though several of them were (at one point or another during this period) republics, proved as prone to pursue war as a means for resolving international conflict as the monarchies that preceded them. In response to this, proposals for European integration in the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries took a new approach. The proposals of Saint-Simon, Loucheur, and Briand focused on the argument, first made by Crucé, that free commerce could be an effective vehicle for promoting peace and stability. However, the distinctive element of these three proposals was that they sought to bypass national sovereignty. The institutions they proposed embodied an ideology of technocracy, essentially representing specific economic interests, such as trade associations and industrial and commercial interests (let us term this type of institution a Committee). The objectives of all three of these proposals were to initiate a functional process of integration, wherein the pursuit of increasing economic benefits would lead to a gradual surrender of national sovereignty. Such Committees of technical experts would lead rather than respond to popular and sovereign sentiment.

Thus, by the eve of World War II, we see that the various proposals for European integration can be divided into three distinct approaches:

1. Intergovernmentalism—designed to pursue integration for the purpose of enhancing sovereignty.

2. Supranational federalism—designed to pursue integration for the purpose of constraining sovereignty.
3. Supranational technocracy—designed to pursue integration by bypassing and, ultimately, rendering sovereignty irrelevant.

Each of these approaches relied on distinct and different institutional structures. Intergovernmentalism relied on Councils of representatives of sovereign governments. Supranational federalism relied on parliamentary bodies comprised of representatives directly elected by the people. Supranational technocracy relied on bodies of technical experts. One can easily discern that the three approaches are not actually compatible with one-another. Knowing the ultimate institutional structure which was put in place in 1951 (that of the European Coal and Steel Community, which has evolved into the European Union) to pursue European integration, one can anticipate significant strains and conflicts within the structure of the European Union. We believe that the findings of this paper—that the strains are manifestations of inherent ideological differences embodied in the institutions themselves—can help elucidate and, ultimately, address these strains.

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